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Israel, the European Left and the
Complexity of the Middle East
Colin Shindler
1 The approach of the European Left towards the Arab Spring is still a work in progress.
Opinions are divided. There were initial comparisons to the year of revolutions 1848, the
Prague Spring of 1968,  the Velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and even the
Protestant Reformation. Significantly this idealistic imagery by mainly social democrats
and liberals  began to  disappear  dramatically  by  2012  as  the  initiative  of  the  Google
generation of Tahrir Square was overtaken by the determination of the seasoned activists
of the Muslim Brotherhood. They in turn were displaced by the return of the military
under the command of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2013. The army coup a year later crushed
the Muslim Brotherhood and its incompetent government. But it also restored the ‘ancien
regime’. The well-meaning elite of Tahrir Square was back to square one. Politics had
stood still. The elite were essentially silenced by the realisation of the forces that they
had to confront. They were squeezed mercilessly by a twin-headed hydra. The European
Left  was perplexed by this ever-changing turn of  events.  They were plunged into an
ideological maelstrom. 
2 This double displacement by the Islamists and the military in Egypt disorientated the
European Left. A belief in progress in the Arab world was called into question. There were
now some in the Left  who understood that the Israel-Palestine conflict  was similarly
complex and not simple. The Middle East was not Europe.
3 For European Marxists, the idealism of the Arab Spring offered originally the opportunity
to recruit. It was a focal event which would inspire many into a left wing commitment. An
analogy with the invasion of  Iraq was  drawn:  they opposed western intervention or
support  for  pro-NATO  factions  in  Libya;  they  supported  Assad  in  Syria  because  the
Baathists opposed US imperialism and the regime was a bulwark against  the ‘Zionist
entity’ 
4 Some  saw  the  unfolding  events  in  Cairo  as  a  template  for  a  Hamas  revolt  against
Mahmoud Abbas in Palestine. However the rapid demise of  the Muslim Brotherhood
isolated Hamas. It had originally ditched Iran in favour of its ideological big brother, the
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Muslim Brotherhood – and discovered that it had jumped on the wrong train. Instead it
forced them into an accommodation with Fatah.  Yet the rise of  Palestinian Islamism
during  the  last  twenty  years  had been seen as a  progressive  force  by  many on the
European  Left.  The  Oslo  Accords,  on  the  other  hand,  were  viewed  as  a  betrayal  by
Palestinian nationalists. The very acceptance of Israel, it was argued, was a subterfuge to
move the region into the global market. It also opened up the markets of the Islamic
world to Israel. 
5 With  the  rise  of Islamism  in  the  Arab  world,  there  were  other  areas  of  common
agreement. Islamists and Trotskyists opposed both East and West – as witnessed by the
reaction  to  both  the  Soviet  and  American  presences  in  Afghanistan.  Moreover  both
superpowers had been instrumental in the establishment of Israel in 1948. 
 
Palestinian Nationalism and Islamism 1933-1945
6 The cause of  Palestine never had a  good name in Britain or  France after  1945.  This
derived from the bitter struggle of the British and the French to stop Hitler and the
suffering  endured  under  Nazi  occupation.  In  the  Middle  East,  German legations  had
consistently reported to Berlin demonstrations of unbridled enthusiasm for a National
Socialist  Germany. Regardless of Nazi ideology,  Hitler clearly opposed the enemies of
Arab nationalist movements – the British, the French and the Jews. Political movements
such as  the Baath party,  the Syrian Socialist  Nationalist  party,  the Lebanese Kataeb,
Young  Egypt  and  the  Iraqi  Futuwwah  movement  all  integrated  elements  of  German
National  Socialism  and  Italian  fascism.  Mein  Kampf was  translated  into  Arabic  and
circulated widely in the Arab world.1 There were also exceptions. In Egypt, for instance,
the intellectuals who contributed to the liberal  cultural  journal,  al-Risāla,  vehemently
opposed Nazism and anti-Semitism.2 
7 In view of this background, it was therefore not unexpected that in 1948 the rise of Israel
provoked nationalist attacks on Jews per se – on communities that lived in the Arab world
for millennia. In Iraq a community that had existed since Nebuchadnezzar ruled the land
was stripped of its worldly goods and forced to emigrate en masse to Israel. This took place
even though its  leaders  had publicly  distanced themselves  from Zionism.  Even anti-
Zionist  Jewish Communists were instructed to leave.  In Aleppo at  the end of  1947,  a
pogrom and the destruction of synagogues coerced half the city’s Jewish population to
leave. In Egypt, nearly 40% of the Jewish community had fled by 1950 due to arrests,
killings and confiscations.  In Kuwait,  the minuscule number of  Jews was expelled.  In
Libya, Algeria and Morocco, there were periodic outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. 
8 Both  Islamists  and  nationalists  realised  the  significance  of  Hitler’s  appointment  as
Chancellor  of  Germany in  January  1933.  The Mufti  of  Jerusalem and an assembly  of
notables had expressed their admiration for the new Germany and its anti-Jewish policies
at a meeting with the German Consul at Nebi Musa shortly after Hitler’s accession to
power. The Arab world like Germany saw itself as a victim of the Versailles deliberations.
This was keenly felt by the Palestinian Arabs who viewed the Balfour Declaration and the
British  Mandate  in  that  light.  Unlike  Britain  and  France,  Germany,  stripped  of  its
colonies, had no presence in the Arab world. Moreover Germany was deeply aggrieved
over the loss of its imperial status. There was, for example, a considerable resentment in
forcing the German inhabitants of South West Africa to take British citizenship in 1924. 
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9 Although the Mufti pressed for a policy which would keep Jews away from Palestine,
Hitler  allowed a  large  enough emigration to  simply  get  rid  of  Germany’s  Jews.  This
stopped in 1937 when the Nazis realised that the Peel Commission had recommended the
partition  of  Palestine  and  the  establishment  of  a  state  with  a  Jewish  majority.  Nazi
ideology then took precedence over the expediency of emigration. Hitler’s racist disdain
for Arabs and his unwillingness to interfere in matters concerning the British Empire,
ensured that no practical support was extended. This led to a refusal to provide arms for
the Palestinian Arabs despite the repeated pleas of figures such as Fawzi Qawukji.3 The
Mufti addressed a letter to Hitler on 20 January 1941, declaring the readiness of the Arab
world to participate in the struggle against  the common enemy,  Britain.  The Mufti’s
private secretary was dispatched to Berlin where he proposed Axis recognition of the
independence of all Arab countries under the British and French Mandates as well as
‘British protectorates in the Persian Gulf and South Arabia’. It also requested recognition
of the right of all Arab countries. 
10 To solve the question of the Jewish elements in Palestine and the other Arab countries in
a manner that conforms to the national and ethnic interests of the Arabs, and to the
solution of the Jewish question in... Germany and Italy.4
11 Yet even after the outbreak of war, Hitler was very reticent to go beyond expressions of
sympathy for the Arab cause for fear of upsetting the colonial interests of his allies, the
Italians and the Vichy French in the Middle East and obstructing negotiations which
could  bring  Turkey  into  the  war  on  the  Axis  side.  The  Mufti  argued  that  National
Socialism and Islam shared a common weltanschauung. He was not averse to extracting
teachings  from  the  Koran  and  adapting  them  to  fit  Hitler’s  latest  pronouncement.5
Moreover his involvement in the destruction of the Jews during World War II stretched
beyond anti-British militancy and anti-Zionism.6
12 If Italy’s forces had been successful in September 1940 and entered Cairo, they would
have been welcomed as liberators by the Egyptians. Anwar Sadat commented, ‘except for
ill-luck, we would have joined forces with the Axis, struck a quick blow at the British, and
perhaps won the war’.7 
13 Had it not been for the allied victory at El Alamein in 1942, SS Obersturmbannfűhrer
Walter Rauff would have ordered his einsatzkommando to liquidate the Jews of Palestine.
Moreover, the Nazis expected local participation in their actions.
 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain
14 As the twenty first century beckoned, such an ideological background, tainted by the
Palestinian leadership’s association with Nazism was half-forgotten and relegated to the
history books. Although the European Left made strenuous attempts to confront populist,
obscurantist  and quasi-fascist  movements in Europe itself,  such an approach was not
applied in the Arab Middle East. The cause of anti-imperialism and the desire to overturn
local  dictators took precedence.  The crudeness of  Hamas in resurrecting anti-Semitic
stereotypes or recommending the Tsarist forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, was
glossed over. This contrasted with Arafat’s attempts to distance himself from the Mufti’s
pronouncements a half a century earlier. 
15 In Britain,  the London based spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood established the
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in 1997. The MAB soon joined the Muslim Council of
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Britain which had been established at the behest of the British government as a central
address for British Muslims. The MAB was perhaps the most politically aware of all the
Muslim groups and given its ideological origin was keen to assist Hamas in its struggle
during the al-Aqsa Intifada.
16 The political atmosphere after 9/11 in Britain and the disaffection of second and third
generation  British  Muslims  provided  this  relatively  obscure  organisation  with  the
opportunity to act as the vehicle for protest by a younger generation of the offspring of
immigrants who came mainly from the Indian sub-continent. The MAB expressed the
anger  of  British  Muslims  at  a  broader  political  scenario  beyond  the  Israel-Palestine
imbroglio. Such disaffection, however, coincided with the al-Aqsa Intifada and Sharon’s
military  initiative  against  both  Arafat  and  his  Islamist  opponents.  This  circle  was
expanded further just before the invasion of Iraq when Labour party supporters, liberals
and an array of leftists in Britain joined together with a broad mobilisation of Muslims in
the UK and demonstrated in February 2003 in London in probably one of the largest
demonstrations since the halcyon days of the Vietnam war. Conversely, others on the
European Left viewed Muslim workers as a new proletariat to be cultivated and won over.
In Islamic history, it was argued, there were periods of religious intensity, marked by a
reoccurring theme of a return to the spiritual purity of the times of the Prophet. Such
periods  were  characterised  by  revolutionary  endeavour  against  oppressive
establishments. One leading British Trotskyist argued as early as 1994 that:
Traditionalist Islam is an ideology which seeks to perpetuate a social order which is
being undermined by the development of capitalism. There is a corruption of Islam
by cultural imperialism.8
17 Historically, the feeling that the creation of Israel in 1948 was a grave error grew in an
age of decolonisation and rising Palestinian nationalism. Forgotten was Soviet support for
a two state solution despite the imprisonment of Zionists in the USSR itself. Indeed if it
had not been for Stalin, would UN Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 - which endorsed
the partition of Mandatory Palestine – have attained the statutary two thirds majority?
18 A perplexed leading member of the Palestine Communist Party, Emile Touma, the editor
of al-Ittihad in Haifa, had just returned from a conference of Communist parties in London
in where he had opposed partition. When he heard about the Soviet about-turn in the
spring of 1947, he wrote:
I cannot understand in particular the attitude of the Soviet Union delegation (at the
UN  session  on  Palestine)  to  the  Palestine  problem.  The  major  point  which  is
troubling our people is  the significance of  Gromyko’s  justification of  the Jewish
aspirations for a national home. Does this not help the Zionists to strengthen their
hold  on  the  Jewish  masses  and  is  this  not  a  justification  of  Zionist  ideology?
Further, what is the significance of Gromyko’s clear statement on the solutions of
the Palestine problem. I cannot understand the reference for a bi-national state nor
his reference to partition as a possible solution.9 
19 Touma  said  that  Gromyko’s  statement  was  not  welcome  and  that  partition  was  ‘an
imperial danger threatening peace and stability’.  Such a sentiment was harboured by
many who looked the other way and then quietly followed the Soviet line. 
20 This sense that Israel was an artificial creation, fuelled by superpower rivalry and the
activism of a majority of Jews world-wide, reached a watershed with the collapse of the
Soviet bloc in 1991. The removal of the USSR was the removal of a psychological obstacle
and an inconvenient historical truth. It meant that any recognition that the Jews had a
right to national self-determination could similarly be consigned to the rubbish dump of
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history. It also meant that there were now few restrictions in aligning with the position of
the Arab Left that Israel  in its current form had no right to exist.  And this logically
produced an about turn in the uneasy relationship between Marxists and Islamists. 
21 How did such a situation evolve? The legacy of colonialism in Britain and France is clearly
a major factor. It divides those who believe that the struggle over Palestine is a contest
between two liberation movements, resulting in partition from those who understand it
as an anti-colonial struggle against European imperialism, resulting in one state. 
22 Significantly  Eastern  Europe  which  experienced  regimes  which  espoused  Marxism-
Leninism was hardly involved in colonialist and imperialist enterprises in the developing
world projects a different world view about Israel. 
 
Confusion within the French Left’
23 For the French Left, emerging from the German occupation, the question of Israel after
1948 evolved into a highly perplexing topic. Jean-Paul Sartre was scarred by the memory
of  what  had  happened  to  the  Jews  in  France,  following  the  defeat  in  1940  –  the
discrimination, the betrayals, the deportations, the exterminations. He recognised the
struggle  of  the Jews  in  Palestine  as  early  as  1947  and  argued  that,  following  the
withdrawal of British troops, the UN should have armed the Jews. In 1949, he commented
that the establishment of the state of Israel was one of the few events ‘that allows us to
preserve  hope’.10 His  solidarity  with  the  Jews  stemmed  from  the  time  of  the  Nazi
occupation. 
24 Sartre also supported the Algerian struggle and was a proponent of Nasser’s programme
for ‘Arab socialism’. His solidarity with the Arabs grew out of the Algerian war. 
25 Sartre was of a generation that had experienced the past. The mindset of the succeeding
generation in France did not have that experience.  Its ideological  agenda was forged
through the struggle of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in Algeria and the NLF
(National  Liberation  Front  for  South  Vietnam)  in  Vietnam.  By  the  1960s,  socialist
advocates for Israel such as Leon Blum were long dead. The mentors of the post-war
generation were Frantz Fanon and Regis Debray. The icons of the French New Left were
Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh. 
 
The PCF (Parti Communiste Français) during World War
II
26 Marxism historically  was  never  able  to explain  the  survival  of  the  Jews  throughout
millennia. It was easier to bend the Jews to fit theory rather than the other way around. 
27 In  addition,  the  Nazi  occupation  of  Europe  and  the  misguided  prioritisation  of  the
national interests of the Soviet Union led to a non-linear ideological approach towards
Jews and Jewish nationalism – and later towards the state of Israel. Thus Jewish Marxists
such as Eric Hobsbawm automatically supported the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. Polish Jews
could sadly be sacrificed for the greater good of the survival of the USSR. In part many on
the British and French Lefts – both Stalinist and Trotskyist – depicted the war against
Nazism as one of rival imperialisms, cast in the mould of World War I.  The Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact was set in the template of the prolonged negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in
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1918 whereby Trotsky held off a German invasion of Russia. Moreover the memory of
World War I and its senseless slaughter in the trenches was recalled by many. The death
and destruction of that conflict had resonated down the decades.
28 This deflating of opposition to Nazism in the aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrip Pact
was accentuated when Hitler, following the conquest of Poland, held out an olive branch
to Britain and France in a speech to the Reichstag in early October 1939. The Belgian
Communist party responded with the slogan, ‘Neither London Nor Berlin’ and initiated a
diversionary campaign for higher pay for the mobilised conscripts. With Stalin pushing
behind the scenes,  the secretary-general  of  the PCF,  Maurice Thorez,  left  the French
armed forces as quickly as he had joined – and decamped for the USSR. In November 1939,
the party’s paper, La Voix du Peuple was banned.11 This was followed by the banning of Ce
Soir and L’Humanité and then the party itself. The PCF now even opposed conscription. 
29 Some regarded the struggle against domestic capitalism and its ‘unwanted’ war as of a
higher priority. Why fight fellow workers? This mindset led logically to sabotaging the
war effort against Nazi Germany. They collected classified information from supporters
and sympathisers about weapons and military operations.12 In France, a powder factory at
Sorques, an arms manufacturer at Bourges and an aeroplane motor plant at Boulogne
were also sabotaged during the phoney war.13
30 In France, prominent figures in the PCF such as Florimond Bonte and François Billoux
petitioned the Vichy regime to be permitted to testify against the socialist leader, Leon
Blum, at his trial.14 What would have happened if England had been invaded in 1940?
Would  the  German  army  have  been  welcomed  by  local  Communists  as  workers  in
uniforms? 
31 All this changed with Hitler’s invasion of Soviet Russia.  Local Communists performed
political somersaults without blinking. Such ideological flexibility was also demonstrated
in 1947 when after  three decades  of  persecution of  Soviet  Zionists,  Stalin instructed
Gromyko to  support  the  notion of  a  two state  solution at  the  United Nations.  Local
Communist parties abruptly changed their line towards the emergence of a state with a
Jewish majority within historic Palestine. In May 1948, the PCF organised a mass rally in
support of the new state of Israel in the Vélodrome d’Hiver in Paris.
32 With the show trials and late Stalinism’s persecution of Jews and especially the depiction
of  Zionist  machinations,  hand-in-glove  with  international  Jewish  capitalists,  the  line
changed once more. By January 1953, the PCF dutifully followed the Soviet line on the
Doctors’  Plot.  French intellectuals  such as  Pierre Hervé were enlisted to support  the
Kremlin’s  charges  against  the  Jewish  doctors.15 Anti-Zionist  Jews  such  as  Maxime
Rodinson16 and Francis Crémieux did the same.17 Annie Kriegel was asked to point out
that it was quite possible that Jews like other human beings were capable of terrible
crimes. Louis Le Guillant responded in an article in a party journal whereby he compared
the behaviour of the Soviet doctors to their Nazi colleagues in Dachau.18 In L’Humanité ten
eminent medical experts requested that the convicted defendants should be put in a place
where they could no longer harm anyone.19 
33 By 1956 the twin events of  Hungary and Suez symbolised the bankruptcy of  the old
ideological  order.  Guy  Mollet,  one  of  the  architects  of  the  Suez  fiasco  was  a  social
democrat.  For the adherents of  Communism and its  fellow travellers,  the convoluted
explanations which were offered for the invasion of Hungary, were an ideological and
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moral somersault too far. This sense of disillusionment with the expounders and justifiers
of both Suez and Hungary created a third space for a New Left. 
 
Post-1967 attitudes
34 On the eve of the Six Day war in 1967, amidst talk of another massacre of the Jews – the
imagery in France was that of the emaciated Jew in the striped pyjamas and his post-war
liberated successor, the socialist kibbutznik who made the desert bloom. During the war,
the image of the jackbooted Jewish conqueror emerged, seemingly aided and abetted by a
coordinated Jewish lobby which was centrally pulling the political strings in a multitude
of  countries.  Which  image  was  correct?  Was  Nasser  a  third  world  liberation  hero,
struggling to liberate his people from the colonialist past or an expansionist reactionary
nationalist who had crushed his progressive rivals? Moreover, the US strongly supported
Israel but was deemed responsible for waging war in Vietnam. Yet Ho Chi Minh was an
inveterate Stalinist. There was a belief that even if some aspects of liberation movements
were  reactionary,  they  generally  belonged  to  the  movement  of  progressive  anti-
imperialism.  L’Humanité selected the images which accorded with the PCF’s  policy in
supporting De Gaulle’s pro-Arab stance in 1967 and thereby attempted to connect Israelis
with Nazis and with the war in Vietnam. The Six Day war whipped up all these conflicting




35 This led on to a contemporary attempt to make a distinction between law abiding Jews,
members of valued communities in multi-cultural Europe, from ‘the Prussian aggression
of the Zionists’ in Israel. However a majority of Israelis just happened to be Jews. This was
also related to  the relationship between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism.  While  anti-
Zionism especially amongst Jews has a long pedigree, can anti-Zionism never be anti-
Semitic? 
36 Anti-Semitism on the French Left stretches back to the early nineteenth century. Charles
Fourier commented in the mid-1840s:
Has there ever been a nation more despicable than the Hebrews who have achieved
nothing in art and science, and who are distinguished only by a record of crime and
brutality which at every page of their loathsome annals makes you sick.20 
37 His disciple, the utopian socialist, Alphonse Toussenel wrote Les Juifs, rois de L’époque in
1845. He referred to 'Londres-Juda' in the belief that the English enemy worked together
with the Jews to destroy revolutionary France. 
38 The idea that accusations of anti-Semitism were merely a cover to deflect criticism of
Zionism appeared as early as November 1952 during the Slansky trial  in Prague. The
majority of the defendants were Jewish Communists, falsely accused of being Zionists.
Jewish  Communists  were  mobilised  by  local  parties  in  Western  Europe  to  publicly
denounce the protests of Jewish communal organisations. There was a concerted attempt
to separate accusations of anti-Semitism from denunciations of Zionism. Jacques Duclos
of  the  PCF  refuted  the  accusation  that  anti-Semitism had  played  a  part.  Instead  he
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pointed to the indictment of the atom spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as a true example
of anti-Semitism.21
39 Yet the prison interrogator of Artur London, one of the defendants during the Slansky
trial, told him that Hitler was right about the Jews and ‘we will finish what he started’.
London was astounded: 
These words were uttered by a man who wore the party badge in his buttonhole,
before  three  other  men,  in  uniform  who  tacitly  agreed.  What  did  this  anti-
Semitism, this pogrom spirit, have in common with Marx, Lenin and the party? This
was the first time in my adult life that I was insulted because I was a Jew and was
held to be a criminal because of my race – and that by a man from State Security of
a socialist  country,  a  member of  the Communist  party.  Was it  possible that the
mentality of the SS had arisen in our own ranks? This was the mentality of the men
who shot my brother, Jean in 1941, who deported my mother, my sister Juliette and
her  husband,  and  dozens  of  my family  to  Auschwitz  and sent  them to  the  gas
chamber. I had concealed my race from the Nazis, should I do the same thing in my
own socialist country?22
40 In a celebrated court case in Paris in 1973, an edition of the Soviet Embassy publication,
URSS, was shown to be based on Tsarist anti-Semitic literature. Grigory Svirsky, a recent
Soviet emigrant to Israel,  submitted as evidence a pamphlet by the Okhrana and ‘the
Black Hundreds’ in 1906. Svirsky demonstrated that the ‘quotations’ from the Talmud and
other religious tracts which had been published in URSS were taken ‘word for word,
including spelling mistakes, from the 1906 anti-Semitic pamphlet. There was only one
change: the term ‘Zionist’ had been substituted for the word ‘Jew’.’23
41 There was  also  a  prominence of  non-Jewish Jews in public  campaigns  against  Israel.
Ronnie Kasrils, a founding member of Umkhonto we Sizwe, a government minister in the
new South Africa  and a  leading member  of  the  country’s  Communist  party  strongly
promoted his  Jewishness when opposing Israeli  policies.  Yet  such zeal  often led into
unsavoury characterisations. In 2006, he commented in a Guardian interview:
Israelis claim that they are the chosen people, the elect of God and find a biblical
justification for their racism and Zionist exclusivity.24
42 The  substitution  of  ‘Jews’  for  ‘Israelis’  and  ‘Jewish’  for  ‘Zionist’  sounded remarkably
familiar to comments from far Right politicians of the early twentieth century. 
43 Sartre argued that the Left  was unable to take a position between the rights of  two
national liberation movements and that it was up to the Jews and the Arabs to resolve this
seemingly intractable situation through discussion. Sartre rationally therefore tried to
create a  space for  a  dialogue between the Arab Left  and the Israeli  Left.  Succeeding
generations, however, seem to have lost his understanding of the complexities of history. 
The ideological contortions of the European Left over Israel led some of its adherents into
some very dark places indeed. While adhering to the ideals of universalism, such
acrobatics made many Jews circumspect about the ideological opportunism of certain
sections of the Left. The trauma and tragedies of the twentieth century induced caution. 
44 Such feelings were similarly aroused when sections of the European Left embraced the
upsurge of Islamism in the Middle East as a redeeming angel which would overthrow
dictators and set free the people. What would it mean for the cause of liberal democracy?
As this drama unfolds, it seems that such circumspection and caution expressed back in
2011 was not unfounded. It appears that the choice is between a hardline military regime
and an illiberal Islamist one. Not between democracy and its absence. In the world of
realpolitik, Israel has continually chosen the military because of the inbuilt hostility of
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Islamism to Israel. Many on the far left in Europe, however, find it easier to react to an
identifiable military regime, friendly to the west and to gloss over the inadequacies of an
Islamism which coats itself with a veneer of anti-colonialism. 
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